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I. PLEADING
A. Demurrer
Conclusions.-In an action by the adof
Pleading-(a)
1. Construction
ministratrix of a decedents estate the allegations in the complaint that the
intestate had a policy of insurance on his life for $1,500 and was induced
by the fraud of defendant to make defendant the beneficiary by which
she was able to collect the money upon his death and "that this $1500
insurance money is the property of the estate and defendant is accountable
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to complainant as administratrix of the estate" are sufficient as against a
demurrer on the ground that the complaint fails to show any right or
title in complainant to such proceeds.' This is a very liberal interpretation
of general statements that might be condemned as mere conclusions of the
pleader and is in accord with the general attitude of the supreme court to
discourage delay on account of departures from the orthodox rules governing the form rather than the content of allegations.
(b) Complaint-Violation of Statute.-Plaintiff's complaint alleged that
defendant left his automobile parked on the side of a busy highway without
locking the ignition but leaving the keys therein (this was prohibited by
statute2 ), that the car was stolen by one Joe Lane and that Lane in a
grossly negligent manner drove into the rear of plaintiff's car and caused
specified injury or damage. Defendant demurred on the ground that
Lane's conduct was the efficient, intervening and proximate cause of the
injury or damage. The ruling of the trial court sustaining the demurrer
was reversed on appeal. The allegations in the complaint made it clear
that the described conduct of Lane might have been foreseeable and if
foreseeable, defendant's violation of the statute was the proximate cause of
plaintiff's injury. Whether it was reasonably foreseeable by defendant was
a question for a jury.3
(c) GeneralAllegation-Issue Made by GeneralIssue.-After alleging that
defendant's place of business, wherein a bull owned by him was confined,
was located in a populated area of a town, and several conclusions as to
defendant's duty, plaintiff averred that defendant negligently permitted
the bull to escape and roam unattended. Defendant's sole response was
the plea of general issue. The evidence tended to prove that the bull
escaped from the pen in which it was confined and that the negligent
efforts of defendant and servants to bring the bull under control permitted
it to escape from defendant's premises and to injure plaintiff, a pedestrian
on a street of the town. The court held that this evidence was admissible
and sufficient to support a verdict for plaintiff and judgment thereon. In
the absence of a motion by defendant, the averment was sufficiently
specific to justify the admission of all the evidence of the actions taken to
recapture the bull.4
(d) Scope of General Issue.-On a plea of not guilty in an automobile
intersection case, it was held that the defendant was entitled to rely on the
defense of contributory negligence where the plaintiff failed to move to
require the defendant to plead his defense specially. 5 This is the rule
1. Ferguson v. Moore, 348 S.W.2d 496 (Tenn. 1961).
2. TENN. CODE AmNr. § 59-863 (1956).

3. Justus v. Wood, 348 S.W.2d 332 (Tenn. 1961).
4. Groce Provision Co. v. Dortch, 350 S.W.2d 409 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1961).
5. O'Keefe v. Walker, 350 S.W.2d 295 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1961).
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approved by Caruthers.6
2. Separate Counts-When Required-FailureTo State Separately.-The
Tennessee Court of Appeals seems committed to the rule that where a
single act of defendant causing a single injury violates both a statutory
and a nonstatutory duty, the complaint must be framed in two counts, as
if each violation constituted a separate cause of action. 7 In an action
against a railroad for wrongful death, common law negligence and violations of the Statutory Precautions Act8 were alleged in a single count. The
court of appeals affirmed the refusal of the trial court to submit the issue
of the violation of the act to the jury.9
B. Plea in Abatement-Jurisdictionof Subject Matter in Ejectment
In an action of ejectment for lands bordering on the Mississippi River,
the defendant pleaded that the land in question was in the State of
Arkansas. On the trial of the issue raised by this plea and denial, 'the
question tried was whether the land was within the State of Tennessee
at the pertinent period, about the year 1913. The chancellor found, after
considering voluminous evidence, that the land was then in Arkansas. On
appeal the court held that the evidence did not sustain the chancellor's
finding but preponderated against it, at least as to part of the land, and
remanded the cause to the chancery court.1 0
C. Setoff and Counterclaim
The supreme court, relying upon Caruthers,holds that in statutory setoff
or recoupment the defendant must allege grounds sufficient to support an
independent action and that the same is true as to equitable setoff. 1 This
is certainly contrary to the rule developed by judicial decisions-the socalled common law rule-governing recoupment in most jurisdictions. Setoff
had its origin in statute. In common law recoupment the defendant could
not recover an affirmative judgment; it was purely defensive, and the
same was true under the English setoff statutes.
D. Amendment-Introducing New Cause-RelationBack-Effect on
Periodof Limitations
In an action for workmen's compensation benefits, an amended petition,
stating a new claim against new defendants, was filed on the last day before the statutory period was to expire. The petition, in the form of an
order, was not signed by the judge until nine days later. In rejecting
6. CARVTHrMS, HISTORY OF A LAwsTrJr § 221 (7th ed. 1951).
7. See Little v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., 281 S.W.2d 284 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1954),

criticized in Morgan, Procedure and Evidence-1956 Tennessee Survey, 9 VAND. L.
REv. 1050-51 (1956).
8. TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 65-1208 (1956).
9. Ori v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 348 S.W.2d 809 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1961).
10. Brown v. Brakensiek, 349 S.W.2d 146 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1961).
11. Combustion Eng'r Co. v. McFarland, 349 S.W.2d 138 (Tenn. 1961).
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appellant's contention that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations, the supreme court held that the mere filing of the amended petition
stopped the running of the statute.12 The court started with the proposition
that "a compensation suit is to all intents and purposes related to and
almost identical with that of a suit in chancery."13 A compensation action
is commenced by the filing of a petition. In this case the amended petition
was filed before any answer, demurrer or other pleading was filed, and at
this stage of the litigation, on analogy to equity procedure, the amendment may be made as a matter of course without leave of court. This decision furnishes another example of the liberal attitude of the supreme
court in the application of procedural rules in workmen's compensation
cases.
II. PREs-PRoPER PArTIEs-CoPAINT IN CANcERY
PROaETY SEcoRm By FiR~u

To REcoNvLY

The executor and the legatees named in a will of the testator, the
validity of which has not been judicially determined, are not proper
parties and have no standing to contest a later will or to attack by a complaint or bill in chancery inter vivos conveyances or transfers of property
of the testator to his then wife on the ground that they were obtained by
fraud or undue influence. But the chancellor has authority in such a
situation to order the property impounded and to enjoin its disposition
until the rights of the complainants as executor and legatees of the earlier
will have been determined. 14
III. REMEDIES

A. Certiorari-MotionTo Dismiss Petition-Demurrer
A motion to dismiss a petition for certiorari is treated as a demurrer and
the allegations in the petition are treated as true except those asserting
propositions contrary to facts shown by the record. Thus where the record
contains a return of service of process upon defendant an allegation to the
contrary must be disregarded, for in Tennessee an "officer's return cannot
be overcome by the oath of an interested party." The defendant's remedy
is by an action in chancery to annul the judgment or by an action against
the officer for a false return.15
B. CoramNobis
The writ of error coram nobis authorized and regulated by Tennessee
12. Bowling v. Whitley, 348 S.W.2d 310 (Tenn. 1961).
13. Id. at 312.
14. Crippled Children's Hosp. School v. Camatsos, 349 S.W.2d 178 (Tenn. App.
W.S. 1960).
15. Royal Clothing Co. v. Holloway, 347 S.W.2d 491 (Tenn. 1961).
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Code Annotated sections 27-701 to -708 is limited to "errors of fact in
proceedings of which the person seeking relief has had no notice, or which
he was prevented by disability from showing or correcting, or in which
he was prevented from making defense by surprise, accident, mistake, or
fraud, without fault on his part." It does not reach errors of law as when
the mistake consists in following the advice of counsel given in the
proceeding at a hearing before commissioners and approved by them.
That the action taken in reliance upon the advice resulted in great harm
is immaterial. 16
C. Injunction-AgainstProsecutionof Civil Action-Adequate
Remedy at Law
A valid total defense against the claims of a plaintiff in a pending action
at law constitutes an adequate remedy at law. Thus, where a plaintiff has
brought an action to recover on two insurance policies and the insurance
company after the incontestable clause in each policy had gone into effect
files a bill seeking to cancel the policies and enjoin prosecution of the
action on the ground of fraud in the inducement, a demurrer to the bill
1
will be sustained. 7
D. Conflicting Decisions-DifferentDivisions of Court of Appeals
If there is a conflict between the decisions of one section of the court of
appeals and those of another section, the remedy is by a proceeding before
the court of appeals en banc. Such a proceeding may be held when the
presiding judge determines that it is necessary or desirable. 18

IV. BtuRDN

OF PROOF AND PRESUM=ONS-FSUMONS

In two opinions the supreme court has applied the rule that an official of
government knows the statutory law of the state and has obeyed it in a
situation to which it was applicable. Thus, the court took judicial notice
of the statute creating the Community Services Commission for Nashville
and Davidson County and presumed that the commission had obeyed the
law in the performance of its duties;' 9 in an election contest it applied the
same presumption to the action of election officials in counting and marking
absentee ballots. 20 In neither case did the court discuss the procedural
effect, if any, of the presumption upon the burden of persuasion.
16. Nailling v. State, 346 S.W.2d 247 (Tenn. 1961).

17. National Burial Ins. Co. v. Evans, 347 S.W.2d 34 (Tenn. 1961).
18. Womack v. Caldwell, 349 S.W.2d 795 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1961).
19. State v. City of Nashville, 345 S.W.2d 874 (Tenn. 1961).
20. Dixon v. McClary, 349 S.W.2d 140 (Tenn. 1961).
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V. JuvDiacA No-ncE,
In State v. Nashville2' the supreme court, after reciting the generally
accepted rules concerning judicial notice of acts of the legislature and of
notorious facts, had to solve the problem of the extent of its power and
duty to notice judicially the report of the community services commission,
created by a private act of 1951, for the purpose of making an investigation
and study of specified matters in Nashville and Davidson County and of
making a detailed report of its findings which were to be filed as a public
record in designated places. It held that the private act was to be judicially
noticed, with its provisions creating the commission and defining its duties;
the same was true as to the existence and content of the filed report. But
what of the propositions and conclusions stated in the report? Was each of
them to be accepted as indisputable? Or was the judicially noticed proposition merely that statements in the report furnished a rational basis for
legislation by the legislative bodies of Nashville and Davidson County on
the assumption that the conditions in fact existing therein were substantially as stated? The majority of the court assumed that the propositions
stated in the report were true and that this assumption was subject to be
defeated by evidence to the contrary; but the allegations in the bill or
complaint to the contrary were not evidence and must be disregarded.
The allegations of the bill considered in the light of the judicially
known matters made it clear that the trial of an issue raised by evidence
would result at best only in the conclusion that the truth of the judicially
noticed proposition was reasonably debatable; and a legislative body may
accept as true and as a basis for legislation any reasonably debatable proposition concerning relevant existing conditions.
It is submitted that the real basis of the doctrine of judicial notice is that
our courts are established for the purpose of resolving genuine disputes
and have no power to decide mere hypothetical disputes or moot issues,
and that to allow an indisputable proposition to be judicially disputed is
to resolve a moot issue. The acceptable analysis in the instant case, it is
suggested, is that the report is a public document and that evidence of the
statements therein are admissible under the official statements exception to
the hearsay rule as tending to prove the truth of the matters stated. The
legislative bodies of the city and county may, therefore, enact ordinances
and other legislative measures on the theory that the conditions are as
represented in the report.
VI. Ev-DENcE
A. Relevance
1. Real Evidence-Experiments.-In a criminal prosecution for murder
21. 345 S.W.2d 874 (Tenn. 1961).
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it became important to determine the distance between the weapon and
the body of the victim at which powder burns might have occurred. Experiments made with the fatal weapon with the same type of powder and
ammunition in the presence of the jury would furnish data from which the
jury could draw conclusions dependent only upon what they personally
perceived. But they would have to depend upon the testimony of others
to determine whether or not the same type of powder and ammunition was
used; and without such testimony the personally perceived experiments
would be irrelevant. If the experiments occurred outside the presence of
the jury, the jury would have to depend entirely upon the testimony of
others both as to the identity of the weapon and the kind of powder and
ammunition as well as the results of the experiment. Consequently, it is
inaccurate to apply the term real evidence in such a situation, if by that
term we mean that the evidence is such that its relevant quality is perceptible by the trier of fact by the use of his own senses. Consequently,
evidence of experiments conducted outside the presence of the jury is inadmissible in the absence of testimony tending to show that the conditions
of the experiment were similar to those at the event in issue in all controlling particulars. The requisites are usually expressed in terms of "sub22
stantial similarity," a phrase of exasperating indefiniteness.
2. Other Crimes.-Defendantwas convicted of killing in the perpetration
of a robbery. Evidence was admitted over his objection of a writing by
him stating that he had planned to hold up a truck, rob the truck driver
and then kill him, that he had missed the opportunity to do this, that he
then went to the home of a couple who, he knew, kept money in the
house, robbed the wife and then killed her. His objection was to the reception of that part of the statement which concerned the truck driver. The
court held that the trial judge's ruling was correct on the ground that the
evidence tended to prove criminal intent and a scheme or plan to obtain
money by murder.
The opinion refers to the general rule and seven recognized exceptions
as stated in Mays v. State.A Both in England and the United States the
rule is usually stated in terms of an absolute general exclusion of evidence
of other crimes or wrongs subject to a group of exceptions. Professor
Julius Stone has demonstrated that the decisions both in England and the
United States make it clear that evidence of other crimes or wrongs is
rejected only where it is relevant solely as tending to prove his disposition
to commit such a crime or wrong, or crimes or wrongs generally, as a
basis for an inference that he committed another crime.25 This view is
22. Rhea v. State, 347 S.W.2d 486 (Tenn. 1961).

23. Sims v. State, 348 S.W.2d 293 (Tenn. 1961).

24. 145 Tenn. 118, 238 S.W. 1096 (1921).
25. Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: England, 46 HIAv. L.
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adopted in Uniform Rule of Evidence 55 and provides that such evidence
is admissible where relevant to prove some other material fact including
absence of mistake or accident, motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan or identity.
(a) Previous Sex Offenses.-Evidence of similar offenses (taking indecent
liberties with the prosecutrix, a child nine or ten years of age) is admissible
in corroboration of her testimony as to the offense charged. 26 The relevance
of this evidence as tending to show accused's disposition towards this
child is clear, and there should be no objection to its reception on the
basis of the generally accepted rule excluding evidence of other crimes. In
this connection the opinion holds admissible the child's testimony that she
told a companion about an earlier offense some six months after it happened. The opinion does not make clear the exact ground on which it was
received. This is not a case where failure to complain is evidence of
consent, for consent is not in issue; nor can it be said that this statement
was made under stress of nervous excitement so as to be admissible as
spontaneous. It might be regarded as anticipatory rehabilitation if the
accused denies that he committed the offense. If, as the opinion seems to
say, the delay goes only to the credibility of the statement as evidence of
its truth, then the evidence was clearly hearsay and the decision represents
an extension of the hearsay exceptions in sex offenses.
B. Hearsay
1. Exceptions-Adopted Admissions.-It is too clear for comment that a
statement made by one other than the defendant, accusing the defendant of
having done a criminal act, is unmitigated hearsay and evidence thereof
is inadmissible against him. But if the statement was made in the presence
of the accused and he understood what the stater said, evidence is admissible of the conduct of the defendant in the face of the accusation, in so
far as it tends to show that defendant believed the statement to be true.
And the same is true if the defendant in whose presence the statement is
made is not mentally normal but does realize the import of the statement.
This is often true when the evidence shows that the accused was intoxicated 27 Where the defendant has remained silent, it is usually said that
he has adopted the statement as his own. And many courts apply the rule
to situations where the accused makes an equivocal response, though it is
obvious that his language does not indicate an adoption or approval of the
statement. In such a case it may furnish the basis for a reasonable inference that he believed it to be true, and if so the evidence should be
received. Uniform Rule of Evidence 63(8) (b) makes admissible against
RFv. 954 (1933); Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America,
51 lluiv. L. REv. 988 (1938).
26. Wilkerson v. State, 348 S.W.2d 314 (Tenn. 1961).

27. Oliver v. State, 348 S.W.2d 325 (Tenn. 1961).
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a party to the action statements of which the party with knowledge of
the contents thereof has, by words or other conduct, manifested his adoption or his belief in its truth.
2. DeclarationAgainst Interest-Availabilityof Declarant.-In an election
contest evidence that the custodian of the voting machines involved had
said that he had tampered with the machines was rejected by the trial
judge as pure hearsay. In affirming the supreme court cited a case rejecting
evidence of statements against penal interests, and distinguished such
statements from admissions by a party.z8 Obviously the record and argument of counsel did not adequately present the problem as to the policy
of extending the orthodox exception of declarations against interest to
include declarations against penal interest.
C. Opinion
1. Expert Opinion-(a) Requisite in Malpractice.-The determination by
the trier of fact of the issue of skill exercised by a surgeon performing an
operation such as one of "disc surgery" is "controlled exclusively by expert
testimony." In the absence of such testimony that the proximate cause of
the plaintiff's condition was the negligent conduct of the defendant
physician or surgeon, a judgment for the defendant is mandatory.P This
is the settled rule in the absence of statute. It has been subject to much
adverse comment in cases where an operation has resulted in very serious
injury to the patient. Much of the comment is based on the notion that
the medical profession frowns upon those members who are willing to
testify against their fellows. Of late the comment has concerned the
reluctance of liability insurance companies to write policies covering
practitioners who have given such testimony. Whether these comments are
supported by reliable data is problematical.
(b) Mental Capacity-UltimateIssue.-In a contested will case, reception
of the testimony of a medical witness who had attended the testator, in
answer to a question based on supposed facts, that he "would not think"
the testator capable of transacting business at the time his holographic
will was written was not reversible error. The question was not asked
concerning capacity to make a will, and the court in its instructions carefully distinguished capacity to transact business from capacity to make a
wfil.

30

D. ParolEvidence Rule-Interpretation
Where an integrated bilateral contract contains one printed paragraph
and two additional typewritten paragraphs each dealing with the continuance and termination of the contract, the typed paragraphs will be
28. Sartin v. Stinecipher, 348 S.W.2d 492 (Tenn. 1961).
29. Redwood v. Raskind, 350 S.W.2d 414 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1961).
30. Bruster v. Etheridge, 345 S.W.2d 692 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1960).
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construed most strongly against the party who drafted them and evidence
of the intention of that party as to their meaning is inadmissible. 3' This
decision represents the generally accepted rule on both points.
The meaning of a unilateral document and particularly of a will is to
be determined by considering its entire content. Where the language used
in a will considered as a whole indicates that its draftsman was highly
skilled in the use of technical legal phrases and their meaning, a provision
which leaves the testatrix's real estate to the next of kin of her husband
is not to be determined by the nature of the property devised, whether
real or personal, where the intention is made clear by the context, and the
chancellor was correct in construing next of kin to mean "nearest in blood
relationship" and not heirs. And the court of appeals had no basis for ruling
that the preponderance of the evidence was against the chancellor's interpretation.E. Witnesses
1. Competency-(a) Connection With Tribunal-Juror.-Testimony of
a group of jurors that they did not intend to find the defendant guilty of
the offense for which he was sentenced is inadmissible. On a motion for a
new trial, the affidavits of nine jurors so asserting were rejected. 33 This
case is to be distinguished from those in which the jurors assert that
they all orally agreed to a particular verdict and that there was a mistake
in reducing it to writing or in reporting it to the court.
(b) Mental Immaturity.-A child nine years of age at the time of the
alleged offense and ten years at the time of the trial is competent as a
witness against defendant charged with taking indecent liberties with her.
Her failure to mention the occurrence for six months affects only her
credibility.34 The current cases make it clear that the chronological age
of a child is not decisive of his competency to testify. The test is "whether
he is sufficiently intelligent to observe, recollect and narrate the facts, and
has a sense of obligation to speak the truth."35
(c) Infamy.-The common law rule disqualifying as a witness a person
who has been convicted of a felony has been abolished in most jurisdictions.
Prior to the enactment of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-2712 a
person convicted of specified offenses was incompetent. Thereafter the
disqualification was removed in all litigation not pending at the time of
36
its enactment.
31. Associated Press v. WGNS, Inc., 348 S.W.2d 507 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1961).
32. Fariss v. Bry-Block Co., 346 S.W.2d 705 (Tenn. 1961).
33. Strunk v. State, 348 S.W.2d 339 (Tenn. 1961). The subject of a juror's competency to impeach the verdict of the jury of which he was a member is discussed in
MorGAN, BAsre PnoBLEMs OF EVIDENCE 76-77 (1961).
34. Wilkerson v. State, 348 S.W.2d 314 (Tenn. 1961).
35. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 301 Ky. 562, 565, 192 S.W.2d 480, 481 (1946).
36. Strunk v. State, 348 S.W.2d 339 (Tenn. 1961).
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(d) Impeachment-Bad Conduct Discharge.-In a prosecution for murder
evidence that a witness for the state had been separated from the
military forces by a bad conduct discharge was rejected in the absence of
37
a showing that the bad conduct involved an act of moral turpitude.
(e) Prior Contradiction.-The prosecuting attorney may properly ask a
witness for the state whether she had not, a few minutes before taking
the stand, made to him and another person statements about material
facts contrary to her testimony. But he may not (and in this instance did
not) offer any evidence that she had made such a statement. 38 In this
case the prosecutor followed the generally approved practice. On the
extent to which a party is entitled to impeach his own witness, there is
much confusion in the opinions. The earlier cases seem strictly to prohibit
impeachment.
VII. JURISDICTON AND VENUE

A. Over Person-Serviceof Process-ForeignCorporation
Plaintiff sued the International Salt Company, a New Jersey corporation
with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania, for damages for breach
of contract. The action was brought in the Shelby County Circuit Court.
An attempt was made to obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant
by service upon one Williams, the sole salesman of the defendant in Shelby
County, as "the chief agent of the corporation, residing in the county
where the action is brought . . . ."3 Williams engaged in regular and
continuous solicitation on behalf of the defendant. He signed all the
order blanks which then had to be accepted in Pennsylvania; all payments
and adjustments were handled by the corporation directly although on at
least two or three occasions Williams called to dun persons owing on
past due accounts, and on one occasion he was given a check in payment
of a past account which was forwarded directly to the defendant. Williams could handle the defendant's products only; he displayed samples,
distributed company literature, and operated a company automobile. In
1960 the defendant corporation "made" approximately $10,000 from sales
to wholesale grocery houses in the western district of Tennessee alone. On
these facts, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that Williams was a "mere
soliciting agent" and therefore the defendant was not "doing business" in
Tennessee. 40 The court affirmed the order of the trial court sustaining a plea
in abatement on the ground that the service was void. 41
The "solicitation plus" rule, relied upon by the Tennessee court, was
37. Rhea v. State, 347 S.W.2d 486 (Tenn. 1961).
38. Ibid.
39. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-217 (1956).
40. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-220 (1956).

41. Tucker v. International Salt Co., 349 S.W.2d 541 (Tenn. 1961).
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first announced by the United States Supreme Court in 1907.42 It was one
of the many distinctions as to what constituted "doing business" sufficient
to subject a foreign corporation to state-court jurisdiction. 43 The mere
solicitation of orders that could be accepted or rejected outside the forum
state was not considered "doing business" 44 but, if there were additional
activities, such as continuous negotiations to settle claims, the assertion of
jurisdiction would not offend due process. 45 In 1945 the United States
Supreme Court in InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington46 rejected the "doing business" test in favor of an interest analysis: "[D]ue process requires
only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if
he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice'." 47 In McGee V.
48
InternationalLife Insurance Co.,
it was held that a California court was
able to assert jurisdiction over a Texas insurance company in a suit by a
resident beneficiary despite the fact that the defendant had no office or
agents in California, the insured had been solicited by mail, the contract
was delivered in California, and the premiums were mailed to the home
office in Texas.
In the present case, since the solicitations by the agent were "a regular
course of activity," it would seem that Tennessee has the power to assert
jurisdiction over the defendant.49 But even if this power exists, it does not
necessarily mean that it must be exercised. A state is perfectly free to
decline to expand its jurisdiction to the limits of the federal constitution3 0
Consequently, the present decision could mean that the Tennessee statutory
phrase "doing business" is to be interpreted more narrowly than the permissible limits of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
42. Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 205 U.S. 530 (1907). See International Harvester
Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914).

43. See Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the In Personam
Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. Cm. L. Ia. 569, 584-86 (1958); Developments
in the Law-State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HAnV. L. REv. 909, 922-23 (1960).
44. Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 205 U.S. 530 (1907).
45. St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218 (1913).
46. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
47. Id. at 316.
48. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
49. See, e.g., Lewis Mfg. Co. v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. App. 2d 245, 295 P.2d 145
(Dist. Ct. App. 1956); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 262.05(4) (1958); Revision Notes,
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 262.05 (Supp. 1961); see generally Developments in the LawState Court Jurisdiction, 73 HcAv. L. REv. 909, 998-1008 (1960). Continuous and
substantial solicitation bad been held to be sufficient activities for state-court jurisdiction even before International Shoe. See Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220
N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917) (Cardozo, J.); American Asphalt Roof Corp. v.
Shankland, 205 Iowa 862, 219 N.W. 28 (1928); Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilberts,
Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930) (L. Hand, J.).
50. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
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difficulty with the opinion, however, is that it seems to rest on a mis-

conception of the import of the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court.5 1 The InternationalShoe opinion explicitly rejected the prior notions

that state-court jurisdiction hinges on the quantitative nature of the defendant's activities as reflected in the "doing business" and corporate

"presence" theories of jurisdiction. 52 "Whether due process is satisfied must
depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in the relation to
the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose
of the due process clause to insure."5 3 Because of this misconception, the
Tennessee court never reached the decisive question of statutory construction: if a foreign corporation regularly solicits business in Tennessee, and a
cause of action arises out of these activities, is it within the policy of the
Tennessee statute to assert jurisdiction over the corporation? If the assertion of jurisdiction is within the statutory policy, should the language of
the statute be construed to take on new meaning as jurisdictional concepts
become more flexible?4
51. The court apparently construed International Shoe to be limited to suits for
unemployment compensation taxes and McGee to actions based on state interests
in specially regulating certain types of activities. See Henry L. Doherty & Co. v.
Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). The court's
reliance on Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) seems particularly inappropriate.
In that case it was held that in order for a nonresident defendant to be subject to
the jurisdiction of the state there must "be some act by which the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state ....'
Id. at 253-54. Cf. International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 587-89
(1914). The probability that a misreading of the United States Supreme Court
decisions was the basis of the present decision is strengthened by the Tennessee
court's failure to cite Banks Grocery Co. v. Kelley-Clarke Co., 146 Tenn. 579, 243
S.W. 879 (1922), which adopted the "solicitation plus" rule of Green v. Chicago B. &
Q. Ry., 205 U.S. 530 (1907). The Banks decision was cited by both briefs on the
appeal.
52. See Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508, 510 (2d Cir. 1960).
53. 326 U.S. at 319.
54. Compare Harrington v. Croft Steel Prods., Inc., 244 N.C. 675, 94 S.E.2d 803,
805-06 (1956), with Henry R. Jahn & Son, Inc. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 855,
323 P.2d 437 (1958) and Carl F. W. Borgward G. M. B. H. v. Superior Court, 51
Cal. 2d 72, 330 P.2d 789 (1958). See Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?,
37 TExAs L. BEv. 657, 658-59 (1959). Referring to the Jahn and Borgward decisions,
Justice Traynor said: "Even antiquated statutes, however, may be so geared to the
due process clause of the United States Constitution as to lend themselves to
interpretation in accord with the mutations in that clause. One might note by way
of illustration how the California courts have interpreted an 1872 statute authorizing
service of process on foreign corporations doing business in the state. They have
reasoned that doing business was adopted as a test not for immunity but for jurisdiction,
consonant with the then tenor of the due process clause. Any test of jurisdiction geared
to its then tenor and expressed in pliant language was therefore no more than illustrative of service of process in accord with the jurisdictional concepts of that period.
As those concepts became more flexible the courts found that the wording of the 1872
statute yielded a correspondingly flexible meaning."
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B. Over Subject Matter
1. Circuit Court-Election Contest.-On an appeal from a judgment of
the Circuit Court of Polk County in an election contest, it was urged that
it was error for the circuit court to try the case because under Tennessee
Private Acts of 1911, chapter 413, the Law Court of Ducktown had exclusive jurisdiction. In rejecting this contention the supreme court held
that the grant of jurisdiction to the Ducktown Law Court is concurrent
with the general jurisdiction of the Circut Court of Polk County,56 unless
57
the express provision for exclusive jurisdiction in the law court is met.
Under the private act, the law court had exclusive jurisdiction "in all cases
at law of a civil character" 58 "only where at least one material defendant
resides within its territorial limits." 59 In the present case, the jurisdiction
of the circuit court was sustained because the suits against four of the
defendants who resided in the law court's territory were dismissed, leaving
only defendants who resided in the circuit court's territory.
2. Chancery.-The chancery court has jurisdiction of a claim by the
administrator of a decedent to recover money alleged to belong to the
estate against a person who had received it as executrix of a will of decedent which had been judicially determined not to be the will of decedent.
The complaint alleged that the defendant had received the money as the
result of fraud. On demurrer to the complaint the chancellor ruled correctly that the statute giving the county court jurisdiction over the distribution of the estates of decedents does not deprive chancery of its
inherent jurisdiction over the administration of such estates, and this is
subject to no doubt where there is a question as to the authority of the
executor.60
3. Supreme Court-Moot Issue.-The supreme court has no authority to
render advisory opinions and will not hear moot issues. Hence in a habeas
corpus proceeding it will dismiss an appeal by petitioner as moot when
he is no longer in custody.6 '
VIII. TRIAL
A. Right to Jury Trial
1. Action for Injunction and Damages.-In an action in which plaintiff
55. Tenn. Briv. Acts 1911, ch. 413, § 2 provides "that the Law Court of Ducktown
shall have exclusive general common law jurisdiction, original and appellate, in all
cases at law of a civil character wherein the defendant is a resident . . . in said
"
districts named in the first section of this Act ....
56. TFNrN. CoDE. ANr. § 2-1902 (1956) provides that "the circuit court hears and
"
determines all contests of the election of sheriffs ....
57. Dixon v. McClary, 349 S.W.2d 140 (Tenn. 1961).
58. See note 55 supra.
59. 349 S.W.2d at 143.
60. Ferguson v. Moore, 348 S.W.2d 496 (Tenn. 1961).
61. State ex rel. Lewis v. State, 347 S.W.2d 47 (Tenn. 1961).
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sought an injunction and damages, it appeared that plaintiff was not
entitled to an injunction; it appeared, however, that defendant, without
instituting condemnation proceedings, had taken rights of the plaintiff in a
portion of a stream by diverting it. The chancellor properly retained
jurisdiction to determine the amount of the damages. He appointed the
clerk and master to hear evidence and determine the issue of damages
and report. Plaintiff without- objection participated in the hearing. The
supreme court held that the findings of the master approved by the
chancellor were effective against plaintiff, although he would have been
62
entitled to a jury trial on the issue of damages had he requested it.
2. Severance for Trial.-Where three persons were named as defendants
in an indictment and all were charged as principals, the denial of a motion
63
for a separate trial by one of them was not error
3. Consolidation for Trial.-The ruling of the trial judge consolidating
for trial two or more offenses charged against defendant will not be
disturbed on appeal in the absence of an affirmative showing that defendant was prejudiced thereby. And this is true although the offenses
occurred on different dates and had no connection in fact with each
other.P
B. Instructions to Jury
1. Statutory Requirement of Writing.-A writing setting forth instructions
to the jury containing lines drawn through some words indicating deletions
was not misleading, though those words were still legible, and was properly
submitted to the jury. The opinion made no reference to the statute requiring every word of the charge to be written.P
2. Request To Charge-(a) When Necessary.-Where two defendants
were on trial charged with the same offense, omission to instruct the jury
that they might find one of them guilty and acquit the other was not error
in the absence of a request even if there was evidence which would support
66
such an instruction.
(b) Request for Clarifying Instruction.-Where the trial judge admitted
the results of a blood analysis showing an alcoholic content of 23%by a
qualified chemist and his statement that the medical and legal professions
considered an alcoholic content of over 15%1 as "having tendencies of67
intoxication," the omission of any reference to the applicable statute
and the presumption created by it was not error. The judge correctly
charged that if the defendant uses an intoxicant "to the extent that it
62.
63.
64.
65.

Evans v. Wheeler, 348 S.W.2d 500 (Tenn. 1961).
Stallard v. State, 348 S.W.2d 489 (Tenn. 1961).
Bullard v. State, 348 S.W.2d 303 (Tenn. 1961).
Strunk v. State, 348 S.W.2d 339 (Tenn. 1961).

66. Ibid.
67. TENN.

CODE ANN.§

59-1033 (1956).
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impairs his vision, the free exercise of his mind, or the free use of his
body and limbs so that it is calculated to and does interfere with his
driving and operation of a motor vehicle, then he would be guilty . . .
and you would so find." If defendant desired a qualifying instruction, he
should have made a specific request.6
3. Refusal of Request-When Proper.-A refusal of a request by defendant to charge that the jury might find defendant guilty of a "lesser
included offense" was correct where the evidence made it clear that he
was either guilty of the offense charged or guilty of no offense.6 9 The
opinion assumes that the judge is bound to charge concerning "lesser
included" offenses where the evidence would support a pertinent finding.
C. DirectedVerdict
1. Effect of Evidence Received After Defendant Has Rested.-An accused cannot limit the prosecution's case against him to the evidence introduced before he rested. Evidence introduced thereafter against other
defendants may be considered against him.70 If defendant's motion for a
directed verdict at the close of the state's evidence had been granted,
obviously he would have been out of the case and evidence received
thereafter would have had no effect upon his case; but though there was
no issue as between him and any one of his codefendants, still any evidence
in the case properly received while he is still a party is usable regardless
of its source.
2. Performance of Condition-Notice of Vacancy or Nonoccupation of
Insured Building.-The policies of fire insurance upon a building and its
contents excepted liability for loss occurring while the bulding "whether
intended for occupancy by owner or tenant is vacant or unoccupied beyond a period of sixty days." The evidence showed that the building was
"padlocked" pursuant to a decree of court and for 113 days thereafter
and prior to its destruction by fire was used for nothing but storage. No
notice of nonoccupancy was given to defendant insurance company or
to its local agent. A news item in local newspapers concerning the padlocking was known to the local agent. Thirty days after the padlocking, the
defendant company accepted payment of the amount still due on the
premium of the policy covering the building. In an action to recover on the
policy the trial judge directed a verdict for the defendant on the ground
that the use of the building for storage and the occasional visits of the
owner to the premises did not constitute occupancy and there was no
evidence to justify a finding of actual or implied knowledge of the defendant of the continuing nonoccupancy of the building when it accepted the
68. Robinson v. State, 347 S.W.2d 41 (Tenn. 1961).
69. Strunk v. State, 348 S.W.2d 339 (Tenn. 1961).
70. Oliver v. State, 348 S.W.2d 325 (Tenn. 1961).
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payment some thirty days after the padlocking. The court of appeals
1
affirmed the ruling on appeal from the judgment.7
IX. JuDGmENT-lEs JuDICATA-SPxrriTNG

While plaintiff's action against Knox County was pending for taking
a strip of her land for road purposes and raising the grade of the road and
draining it so as to cast water upon her land and damage the sewage
disposal field for plaintiff's septic tank, plaintiff brought another action
against the county for damages to her property growing out of the grading
and draining of the road. After dismissal of this latter action and appeal
to the circuit court, the action was tried by the circuit judge without a
jury. The court found that plaintiff's property had been substantially
damaged by the grading and draining and rendered judgment for her for
$1,550. This judgment was affirmed by the court of appeals and certiorari
was denied by the supreme court. After paying the judgment, defendant
filed a plea setting up the judgment as a bar to the pending action. The
trial judge sustained the plea.72
In a very interesting article"s Professor Cleary has pointed out that one
of the reasons for the doctrine of res judicata is that a defendant should
not be harrassed by repeated trials of the same cause. The rule against
splitting, he believes, is not a necessary corollary of this proposition. If the
plaintiff is required, as a condition precedent to his second action, to
reimburse defendant for the expense and inconvenience to which he has
been put by the splitting, then he will not be unduly harmed. If in a
particular case the application of the rule against splitting will cause the
plaintiff substantial harm, the court in the exercise of a sound discretion
should permit him to avoid the rule on compliance with such a condition.
The other reasons of policy should give way to the fundamental purpose
of a judicial trial, the just determination of a dispute between the litigants.
X. MOTION FOR NEw TmA-GRoums

A. Misconduct of Juror-FalseStatement
On motion for a new trial for misconduct of a juror in making false
statement on voir dire, a witness testified that the juror had before being
called made a statement indicating her belief that defendants were guilty;
the juror denied it. The trial court's finding that the juror was a qualified
juror was approved on appeal.74 It is too clear for comment that in such

a situation the trial judge's finding as to the credibility of the respective
71.
72.
73.
74.

Cashen v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 348 S.W.2d 883 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1961).
Hawkins v. Dawn, 347 S.W.2d 480 (Tenn. 1961).
Cleary, Res JudicataReexamined, 57 YALE L.J. 339 (1948).
Stallard v. State, 348 S.W.2d 489 (Tenn. 1961).
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witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal.
B. Mistaken Interpretationof Jury's Findings
In an eminent domain proceeding the jury found separately the value of
the land taken, the incidental damages to the owner of the fee, the value
of the lessee's unexpired lease thereon and the incidental damages for
removing the lessee's fixtures and equipment, and the trial judge ordered
judgment for the owner for the total sum. The supreme court reversed
the judgment and ordered a new trial in which the jury should be instructed as to the award to be made (1) to the owner-lessor and (2) to
the tenant-lessee.7 5 On the face of the opinion it seems reasonably clear
that there was no mistake in the findings of the jury, and that the error was
solely in the conclusion of law to be drawn therefrom. If so, why should
there be a new trial on the issue of fact? Evidently the court's examination
of the record and the instructions revealed more sources of confusion than
appear in the report.
XI. APrEAL AND ERROR
A. PreliminaryRequisites
1. Time To Appeal-Final Judgment Rule-Finality of Judgment-Order
of Remand.-In a court of general sessions, after judgment by default was
entered against defendants, the judge granted an appeal to the circuit
court; after trial on the merits, the latter court dismissed the action. On
appeal the court of appeals held that the appeal to the circuit court had
been erroneously granted, reinstated the default judgment and remanded
the case to the circuit court. Petition for certiorari to the supreme court
was denied some eighteen months after the original order and remand.
Within a month thereafter the circuit court granted certiorari to remove
the case to the circuit court for trial; it denied a motion to dismiss the
petition for certiorari, and some months later dismissed the action on the
merits. From the judgment of dismissal plaintiff appeals in error. The
decision on this appeal turns on the issue of whether the earlier decision of
the court of appeals remanding the case to the circuit court was effective
to restore the default judgment in the court of general sessions. The
decision is that the remand to the circuit court for reinstatement of the
general sessions judgment was not effective to restore the judgment until
the order was filed in the circuit court. Consequently the action of the
circuit court in issuing certiorari to the general sessions within one month
after the order of remand was filed was timely and the objection that
there was in that court nothing upon which the writ of certiorari could
operate was without merit.7 6
75. Moulton v. George, 348 S.W.2d 129 (Tenn. 1961).
76. Rutledge v. Swindle, 348 S.W.2d 888 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1960).
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2. Motion for New Trial-Decision of Chancellor on Certiorari From
Civil Service Commission.-On certiorari to chancery from a decision of the
civil service commission discharging an employee, the employee appealed.
The chancellor's review is limited to the issue whether there is in the
record material evidence in support of the commission's action, and the
same is true on appeal. Nevertheless the court held that a motion for a
new trial is a prerequisite to his right to appeal7 7 How in such a case
where the chancellor can take no new evidence and is confined to examination of the record, a motion for a new trial can serve any useful
purpose is very difficult to understand.
3. Assignment of Error.-Assignments of error not included in a motion
for a new trial or otherwise brought to the attention of the trial judge will
not be considered on appeal, 78 but the failure of appellant to comply with
the rules of the appellate court will not be cause for dismissal of the appeal
where the assignments of error are reasonably specific and the brief contains sufficient reference to pertinent materials. 79 It continues to be puzzling why our appellate courts should be required to pass upon matters
which indicate counsel's ignorance of rules of practice that are well settled
in Tennessee.
B. Scope of Review
1. Statutory Limitation.-A landowner who had under the applicable
statute 80 an opportunity to appear at a hearing before drainage commissioners appealed to the circuit court from the commissioners' finding that
his lands would not be benefitted by the construction of a levee; the
circuit court affirmed but on appeal the court of appeals reversed on the
ground that the landowner had previously had no opportunity to show
that the lands would not be benefitted by the levee. On certiorari the
supreme court reversed the decision of the court of appeals. The court
pointed to the prEviously determined constitutionality of the statute which
provided that the court could increase, diminish, annul or affirm the apportionment and assessments, but was not competent to show that the
lands assessed would not be benefitted by the improvement. Moreover, the
constitution does not require more than one hearing, namely, the hearing
before the commissioners. Therefore the circuit court had no authority or
power to consider any evidence on the forbidden issues.81
2. Findings of Chancellor and Court of Appeals.-Where the chancellor
concurs in the findings of the master that the property owner suffered
77. Rhem v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 350 S.W.2d 292 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1961).

78. Wilkerson v. State, 348 S.W.2d 314 (Tenn. 1961).
79. Brown v. Brakensiek, 349 S.W.2d 146 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1961).
80. TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-901 (1956).

81. Moody v. Dyer County Levee & Drainage Dist. No. 1, 348 S.W.2d 328 (Tenn.
1961).
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no damage by the diversion of a stream and the court of appeals has
affirmed, the findings are conclusive upon review by the supreme court.
In its opinion the court noted that in another action by this plaintiff against
another defendant the same issue as in the case at bar was determined
against the plaintiff. It held that the lower courts had correctly held
that that determination was the law of this case. 2 Whether the court used
the phrase "law of the case" in the sense that the court on a new review
of the same cause between the same parties will not reexamine the decision on the same issue is not clear and a discussion of that doctrine
would not be helpful.
3. Remand to Lower Court With Directions.-Where the court of appeals
had refused to consider the bill of exceptions and the supreme court on
review had remanded the cause to the court of appeals for consideration
of the alleged errors specified in the bill, the court of appeals is bound
to do so and will proceed as if the bill had been properly presented in the
first instance. The court here uses the phrase "law of the case" without
3
any explanation of the doctrine to which that phrase is generally applied
4. Jury-Waived Trial-When Chancellor Sits as a Jury.-By agreement of
counsel the chancellor sat as a jury at the trial. In such a situation he permitted defendants to introduce their evidence after their motion to dismiss
had been denied. On appeal from the judgment the scope of review is the
same as that of an appeal in error from a judgment entered on the verdict
of a jury.8 4
C. Dispositionon Appeal
1. Judgment-Remand.-In a condemnation proceeding the trial judge
erroneously set aside an award of incidental damages on the ground that
the condemnee was not entitled to incidental damages. Obviously the trial
judge had not approved the verdict, and since he must act as a thirteenth
juror, the court of appeals cannot enter judgment for the amount assessed
by the jury but must remand the cause for a new trial. 85 In the absence of
other reasons for remand, why should there be a new trial if the trial
judge on remand corrected his error and approved the verdict?
2. Test of Harmless Error-Refusal To Instruct.-The refusal to give a
requested instruction which is properly framed is harmless error unless
if given it would have changed the result 8 6 This is a very severe test.
Under the generally accepted modem view which recognizes the harmless
error doctrine, the test is whether a correct ruling would probably have had
a substantial influence upon the result.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Evans v. Wheeler, 348 S.W.2d 500, 503, 506 (Tenn. 1961).
Redwood v. Raskind, 350 S.W.2d 414 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1961).
Melhorn v. Melhorn, 348 S.W.2d 319 (Tenn. 1961).
Sanders v. Sullivan County, 348 S.W.2d 909 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1960).
O'Keefe v. Walker, 350 S.W.2d 295 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1961).
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STATES Disnucr CoURT CASES

A. judgment
1. Res Judicata-Identity of Parties.-Where a party not named as defendant openly defended, supported and controlled litigation against
defendant in which plaintiff sought an injunction, that party is bound by

87
the judgment as if it had been formally named as a party defendant.
This rule is most frequently applied in patent litigation, as in this case.

2. Judgment of Tennessee Court-Decision of Appeals Council Under
Social Security Act.-The judgment of the Tennessee court that a workman
is permanently disabled is not binding upon the Appeals Council under
the Social Security Act. Likewise, the conclusions of law by the Appeals
Council are not binding upon the Tennessee district court in reviewing the
findings of fact of the Council to determine whether the findings are supported by any substantial evidence.8
B. Parties-IndispensableParty Defendant
In an action for a declaratory judgment that plaintiff had not been
legally removed from his position as State Administrative Officer, Agricultural Stabilization Office, it appeared that the authority to appoint and
remove was vested by law in the Secretary of Agriculture and those to
whom he had delegated his authority. Any other subordinate would be
unable to restore plaintiff to the position from which he had been wrongfully removed. Therefore the Secretary or one to whom he had delegated
his authority was an indispensable party to this action; the incumbent who
had ousted the plaintiff would not be such a delegate and would be
unable to comply with any judgment ordering plaintiffs restoration to the
position from which he had been wrongfully removed.8
C. Trial-DismissalWithout Prejudice
In an action brought by plaintiff against the United States for recovery
of income taxes paid, on the ground that they had been illegally assessed
and collected, defendant answered alleging that the action was brought in
the wrong district; plaintiff then moved for dismissal without prejudice
in order that he might bring a new action against the District Director of
Internal Revenue in the proper district. The court granted the motion
over the objection of defendant. The court ruled that it had authority
to grant the motion in the interest of justice and to impose terms which
would prevent the imposition of expense and inconvenience upon the
Government.9 0
87. Baltz v. Walgreen Co., 198 F. Supp. 22 (W.D. Tenn. 1961).

88. Martin v. Ribicoff, 195 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. Tenn. 1961).
89. Maupin v. Fry, 194 F. Supp. 867 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).

90. Stevenson v. United States, 197 F. Supp. 355 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).
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XIII. SixTH Cmcurr CoUrRT OF APPEALS CASES
A. Grounds for New Trial-Newly Discovered Evidence
In denying defendant's motion for a new trial after judgment of conviction, the trial judge said that the new evidence -was "cumulative only"
and "would not probably produce an acquittal," and "his testimony would
not have changed the results of the trial" The court of appeals affirmed,
pointing out that the new witness was a collaborator of defendant in the
"acts which were found to be criminal." The trial judge's discretionary
ruling, therefore, would not be disturbed.91
The trial judge, with the apparent approval of the court of appeals,
purportedly applied a more rigid requirement than that usually applied by
most courts. It is usually said that the rule as to cumulative evidence is
subject to exception where the new evidence would probably have "substantial influence" upon the result. Even so, it is a rare instance when
the appellate court disturbs the result of the exercise of the trial judge's
discretion.
B. Appeal and Error
1. Preliminary Requisites-Objection at Trial.-In a criminal prosecution
the trial judge gave an instruction concerning the weight to be given to
the testimony of an accomplice. Although no accomplice testified, the
defendant made no objection to this instruction. Therefore he had no
basis for an assignment of error on this ground.9 2 This is a routine application of the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure. Clearly this is no
case of plain error to be noticed by the court of its own motion.
2. "Erie" Doctrine-Jury Verdicts.-In Byrd v. Blue Ridge Electric Coop.,93 the United States Supreme Court re-examined the doctrine of Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins94 as elaborated in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York.95 Erie
held that the definition of state-created rights and obligations by state
courts was binding on the federal courts in diversity suits. Guaranty Trust
said that the application of the Erie doctrine did not depend on whether
the rules in question were labeled "substantive" or "procedural" but on
whether the state rule would be "outcome determinative": the federal
court in diversity must follow the state rule if that rule would significantly
affect the result of the litigation. Byrd rejected the outcome test in favor
of an interest analysis. In holding that a federal court should not apply a
state rule which had altered the common law judge-jury relationship, the
Court developed a two-step analysis: is the state rule an "integral part"
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Ashe v. United States, 288 F.2d 725 (6th Cir. 1961).
United States v. Dorsey, 290 F.2d 893 (6th Cir. 1961).
356 U.S. 525 (1958).
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
326 U.S. 99 (1945).

1962 ]

PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE

of the right created by state law?9 If it is not, does "the objective that
the litigation should not come out one way in the federal court and another
way in the state court" 97 outweigh the federal interest in its rule? In Byrd
it was held that the state rule was not an integral part of the state right
and that the distribution of the functions between judge and jury was an
"essential characteristic" of the federal system of administering justice.
The Byrd analysis was applied in a recent decision of the court of
appeals. The plaintiff, a New Jersey resident, was severely injured while
using a machine which his employer had purchased from the defendant,
an Ohio corporation with its principal place of business in Tennessee. Suit
was started in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Tennessee on two theories: (1) negligence on the part of the defendant in
designing the machine and (2) breach of implied warranty of the safety
of the machine. The jury returned a general verdict in favor of the
plaintiff. Thereafter the trial judge determined that he had erred in submitting the warranty claim to the jury and a new trial was granted. On
appeal,93 the court of appeals reversed and ordered the verdict reinstated
and judgment entered thereon 99
The issue on appeal was whether the Tennessee "two issue rule" should
have been applied by the federal district court. 100 The appellant urged
that even if it was error to submit the warranty count to the jury, the
negligence count was sufficient to sustain the general verdict and under
Tennessee law a general verdict must be upheld if "there was at least one
good count correctly submitted to the jury and supported by substantial
evidence .. ..

',101

In accepting this contention, the court of appeals held

that the application of the Tennessee rule would have a substantial effect
on the outcome and that there was no countervailing federal interest.
Applying the Byrd analysis, the state rule governed.
It would appear that the court of appeals was too quick to find no
significant federal interest. The gist of Byrd is that state rules of practice
cannot alter the decision-making process of the federal courts. 102 Thus,
Byrd rested heavily on Herron v. Southern Pacific Co.103 which held that
the Conformity Act did not require the federal court sitting in diversity to
96. Cf. Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208 (1939) which held that state
rules as to burden of proof are substantive for Erie purposes because they are an
integral part of substantive rights.
97. 356 U.S. at 538.
98. An interlocutory appeal was allowed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1958).
99. Tracy v. Finn Equip. Co., 290 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1961).
100. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-1317 (1956) provides: "Verdict applied to good
count. If any counts in a declaration are good, a verdict for entire damages shall be
applied to such good counts."
101. 290 F.2d at 499.
102. See The Supreme Court,1957 Term, 72 HAv. L. REv. 77, 147-50 (1958).
103. 283 U.S. 91 (1931).
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be bound by a state constitutional provision making the jury the sole
arbiter of contributory negligence. Herron cited with approval Indianapolis
& St. L.R.R. v. Horst'o4 which held that a federal court is not subject to
state regulations requiring a jury to answer special interrogatories in
addition to the general verdict, which rule has been followed since Erie.10 5
Since federal law, not state law, governs the method of submitting issues
to the jury, it follows that federal law and not state law must govern the
evaluation of the jury verdict. 106 Both aspects of control over jury
verdicts are interrelated. Both are part of the decision-making process
and should be considered of equal importance in the federal courts. In the
present case, the court of appeals should have applied the federal rule in
07
evaluating the general verdict.
3. Affirmance of Order of Deportation by Court of Appeals-Motion in
District Court To Reopen.-After two judgments in the court of appeals
affirming district court judgments upholding the order of deportation, appellant sought to reopen the case in the district court. Appellant had
not petitioned for a rehearing in the court of appeals or for certiorari
to the United States Supreme Court. The district court refused to entertain
the motion without approval of the court of appeals. On petition for such
approval the court held that the motion to reopen under Rule 60(b)
cannot be used as a substitute for appeal. 1 8 Query: will petitioner's failure
to exhaust his rights to move for a rehearing or for certiorari prevent consideration by resort to habeas corpus proceedings?
4. Rejection of Evidence-PrejudicialError.-When on appellate review
the court considers the value of evidence rejected by the trial judge and
finds that it would not have been helpful to the jury, the judge's ruling
will be upheld. It is not error to reject such evidence. 09
5. Reception of Evidence-Conditional Rejection of Evidence-Co-conspirators.-After admitting evidence of a statement of conversations of
appellants codefendants, alleged to be co-conspirators, the trial judge
charged: "[T]his alleged statement, alleged to be made by these men, will
104. 93 U.S. 291 (1876).
105. See 5 MOORE, FEDmtaL PRAcCE 97 (Supp. 1961); 2B BARRON & HoLOrFr,
F~nERAL PRACTCE AND PNocnunE § 1052 (Wright ed. 1961).
106. See BARRON & HOLTzOFF, op. cit. supra note 105. Williams v. Powers, 135

F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1943), a pre-Guaranty Trust v. York case, held that the Ohio
"two-issue rule" did not apply in diversity. In other diversity cases, there is no
mention that the Erie doctrine might require the application of state rules. See, e.g.,
Lee v. Pennsylvania R.R., 192 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1951).
107. There might be some difficulty in determining what the federal rule is.
Compare Salem v. United States Lines Co., 293 F.2d 121, 125 (2d Cir.), aff'd in part,
reo'd in part on other grounds, 368 U.S. 811 (1962), with Lee v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 192 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1951).

108. Williams v. Sahli, 292 F.2d 249 (6th Cir. 1961).
109. Louisville &N.R.R. v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 295 F.2d 308 (6th Cir. 1961).
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not be considered except with respect to their cases. Unless the jury finds,
first, there was a conspiracy and, second, that these statements were made in
furtherance of the conspiracy. If the jury so finds, then the jury will
consider the alleged statement with respect to all of the defendants." The
court of appeals approved this as "a clear and correct statement of the law
of conspiracy."110
This is another example of an excellent trial judge's repetition of an
approved formula-which will not stand analysis. It makes the jury an
appellate tribunal on the admissibility of evidence, but requires it to find
the defendant guilty before it can consider this evidence which is relevant
only on the issue of guilt.
110. United States v. Dorsey, 290 F.2d 893, 894 (6th Cir. 1961).

